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Summary
•	 Since	Vladimir	Putin	returned	to	the	Kremlin	as	President	in	
May	2012,	the	Russian	system	of	power	has	become	increasing-
ly	authoritarian,	and	has	evolved	towards	a	model	of	extremely	
personalised	 rule	 that	derives	 its	 legitimacy	 from	aggressive	
decisions	 in	 internal	 and	 foreign	 policy,	 escalates	 the	 use	 of	
force,	and	interferes	increasingly	assertively	in	the	spheres	of	
politics,	history,	ideology	and	even	public	morals.	The	events	of	
recent	years	–	the	annexation	and	occupation	of	Crimea,	mili-
tary	 operations	 in	 eastern	 Ukraine	 and	 the	 assassination	 of	
Boris	Nemtsov	–	all	testify	to	the	scale	of	the	Russian	political	
regime’s	evolution;	and	at	the	same	time	they	have	been	push-
ing	the	regime	towards	further	radicalisation	and	preventing	
a	return	to	the	earlier	pragmatic	policy	of	reconciling	the	inter-
ests	of	various	groups	in	the	elite	and	the	public.
•	 The	 nature	 of	 the	 regime’s	 internal	 operation	 has	 also	
changed.	Putin’s	power	now	rests	on	charismatic	 legitimacy	
to	a	much	greater	extent	than	it	did	during	his	first	two	presi-
dential	terms;	currently	the	President	is	presented	not	only	as	
an	effective	 leader,	but	also	as	 the	sole	guarantor	of	Russia’s	
stability	and	integrity.	His	inner	circle	of	people	influencing	
the	decision-making	process	has	become	even	narrower,	and	
is	dominated	by	members	of	the	secret	services	who	share	the	
president’s	worldview	and	his	 vision	of	 the	 threats	 faced	by	
Russia.	Other,	more	moderate	groups,	 such	as	businessmen,	
economists	 and	 lawyers,	 have	 been	 marginalised.	 The	 en-
tire	mechanism	whereby	the	Kremlin	manages	 the	elite	has	
also	changed,	as	positive	 instruments	 (distribution	of	assets	
and	promotions,	guarantees	of	 immunity)	have	been	 largely	
replaced	by	negative	 instruments	(demonstrations	of	power,	
disciplinary	measures	and	selective	punishments).
•	 After	 15	 years	 of	 Putin’s	 rule,	 Russia’s	 economic	 model	
based	on	revenue	from	energy	resources	has	exhausted	its	
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potential,	and	the	country	has	no	new	model	that	could	en-
sure	continued	growth	for	the	economy.	The	main	reasons	
for	this	are	the	structural	factors	that	stem	from	the	general	
philosophy	underlying	the	Putinist	system,	i.e.	the	primacy	
of	 control	 over	 development.	 This	 priority	 has	 prevented	
a	 diversification	 of	 the	 Russian	 economy,	 promoted	 the	
centralisation	 of	 decision-making	 processes,	 exacerbated	
the	weakness	of	 institutions	 (including	 the	 judiciary)	and	
guarantees	of	property	rights,	curbed	competition	and	fur-
ther	undermined	the	investment	climate.	It	has	also	led	to	
a	negative	selection	of	state	cadres	(whereby	those	who	are	
loyal	and	passive	were	promoted,	and	those	who	are	active	
and	 creative	 faced	blocks	 to	promotion	and	development).	
As	a	result	of	this,	standards	of	governance	have	been	dete-
riorating,	capital	has	been	f leeing	in	record	levels,	and	Rus-
sia	has	been	experiencing	a	brain	drain	and	an	intellectual	
degradation.
•	 The	original	social	contract	has	also	reached	the	limits	of	its	
potential;	with	the	economy	deteriorating,	the	Russian	leader-
ship	is	no	longer	able	to	guarantee	steadily	improving	stand-
ards	 of	 living,	which	 have	 hitherto	 provided	 the	 leadership	
with	undiminished	popularity.	However,	the	government	has	
been	able	to	effectively	make	up	for	the	sacrifices	that	people	
have	had	 to	make	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 last	 year,	 using	 an	
authoritarian	 consolidation	 fuelled	 by	 an	 actively	 promoted	
sense	 of	 threat	 from	 the	 ‘hostile’	West	 and	pride	 in	Russia’s	
territorial	conquests.	The	attitudes	of	Russian	society	at	large	
are	helpful	 in	maintaining	the	current	authoritarian	model,	
which	 is	 being	 held	 together	 by	 social	 apathy,	 atomisation,	
mutual	distrust	and	the	lack	of	horizontal	social	relations	that	
could	give	rise	to	lasting	civil	society	structures.	The	trauma	
of	 the	 Soviet	Union’s	 collapse,	which	 is	 still	 alive	 in	 Russia,	
makes	 people	more	 susceptible	 to	 the	 government’s	 imperi-
alistic	 stratagems,	 such	as	 the	annexation	of	Crimea,	which	
evoked	social	euphoria.
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•	 The	Putinist	system	of	power	is	starting	to	show	symptoms	of	
agony	–	it	has	been	unable	to	generate	new	development	pro-
jects,	and	has	been	compensating	for	its	ongoing	degradation	
by	escalating	 repression	and	 the	use	of	 force.	However,	 this	
decline	is	not	equivalent	to	the	system’s	imminent	collapse,	as	
the	ruling	team	have	instruments	at	their	disposal	to	extend	
the	present	state	for	years,	even	if	degradation	continues.	On	
the	other	hand,	the	risk	of	destabilisation	is	inscribed	in	the	
very	nature	of	this	system;	the	lack	of	any	formal	or	institu-
tional	guarantees	 for	political	actors	makes	 it	 impossible	 for	
them	to	cede	power	voluntarily,	as	doing	so	would	mean	risk-
ing	their	positions,	possessions	or	even	their	personal	securi-
ty.	This	in	turn	makes	a	peaceful	succession	of	power	unlikely	
and	 imposes	 the	 logic	of	a	constant	extension	of	 the	 leader’s	
rule.	As	 the	 last	 15	years	of	Russia’s	history	have	shown,	 the	
most	effective	way	to	consolidate	power	and	boost	the	popu-
larity	 of	 the	 leader	 is	 to	 resort	 to	 ‘extraordinary	measures’,	
and	especially	military	successes.	This	means	that	the	possi-
ble	further	erosion	of	power	makes	it	extremely	likely	that	the	
Russian	leadership	will	escalate	the	use	of	such	methods.
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IntroductIon
While	the	last	15	years	of	the	Russian	political	regime	should	be	
viewed	in	terms	of	continuity,	the	country’s	political	system	has	
nonetheless	undergone	a	considerable	evolution	within	that	peri-
od.	As	a	result	of	the	policy	of	centralisation,	the	relatively	plural-
ist	model	of	the	last	1990s	has	gradually	transformed	into	a	clearly	
authoritarian,	monocentric	and	personalised	model.	 In	 its	most	
recent	phase,	i.e.	since	Putin’s	return	to	the	Kremlin	in	2012,	this	
system	has	established	tight	control	not	only	over	politics	and	the	
economy,	but	also	the	spheres	of	ideology	and	public	morals,	and	
has	stepped	up	repression	and	escalated	the	policy	of	military	ex-
pansionism.
The	comprehensive	analysis	of	Vladimir	Putin’s	15	years	in	pow-
er	 shows	a	persistent	 legacy of authoritarian rule,	which	has	
been	the	reality	for	Russia	throughout	almost	the	entire	history	
of	its	statehood.	That	legacy	ensures	that	the	authoritarian	model	
is	able	to	reproduce	 itself	after	each	crisis	or	attempted	reform.	
At	 its	core	 is	 the	political	culture	of	 the	generation	currently	 in	
power,	i.e.	the	habits	of	taking	authoritarian,	top-down	actions,	
taking	arbitrary	decisions	behind	 the	scenes,	and	stymying	 the	
development	of	any	tools	of	social	control	of	government.	During	
Putin’s	rule	the	secret	services,	the	most	repressive	institution	of	
the	Soviet	state,	have	been	the	pillar	of	the	president’s	power.	The	
worldviews,	mentality	and	interests	of	the	secret	service	have	left	
a	mark	on	Russia’s	policy,	both	domestically	and	internationally.	
The	authoritarian	culture	of	governance	has	also	been	supported	
by	the	legislation:	the	Russian	constitution	vests	nearly	full	pow-
er	in	the	state	in	the	president’s	hands.	And	finally,	this	model	has	
been	kept	 together	by	 the	attitudes	of	 the	majority	of	Russians,	
whose	worldviews	and	political	culture	have	been	shaped	by	the	
legacy	of	authoritarianism.	
The	authoritarian	nature	of	the	Putinist	system	has	not	been	af-
fected	by	the	few	attempts	at	modernising	 it	 (albeit	 to	a	 limited	
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extent),	 i.e.	 the	 liberal	 economic	 reforms	 initiated	 after	 Putin	
came	to	power	in	2000,	or	the	 liberal	modernisation	rhetoric	of	
Dmitry	Medvedev’s	presidency	 (2008–2012).	The	effects	of	 those	
efforts	were	 limited	and	 short-lived	because	many	of	 the	meas-
ures	taken	were	merely	illusory	(e.g.	Medvedev’s	modernisation	
rhetoric),	or	stumbled	on	a	fundamental	obstacle	stemming	from	
the	very	nature	of	the	system,	i.e.	the primacy of control over 
development.	 The	Kremlin’s	 imperative	has	 invariably	 been	 to	
keep	and	consolidate	power,	and	reforms	were	treated	merely	as	
a	means	to	enhance	the	efficacy	of	the	state	structures	or	improve	
their	image.	Moreover,	the	liberal	economic	reforms	initiated	by	
Putin	coincided	with	a	strong	tendency	towards	centralisation	in	
the	political	and	social	spheres,	which	sought	to	restore	the	presi-
dential	team’s	control	over	political	actors	(regional	governments	
and	political	parties)	as	well	as	the	economy,	and	reinforced	the	
‘manual	control’	mode	of	governance	at	the	expense	of	institution-
al	mechanisms.	Likewise,	the	modernisation	efforts	undertaken	
during	Dmitry	Medvedev’s	short	presidency	were	superficial,	and	
expectations	of	genuine	liberalisation,	which	some	groups	in	the	
political	elite	and	the	wider	public	had	started	to	cherish	at	that	
time,	were	suppressed	by	the	counter-reforms	initiated	after	Pu-
tin	returned	to	the	Kremlin.
Putin’s	policy	was	a	reaction	to	the	ferment	with	which	some	parts	
of	the	elite	and	the	public	responded	to	the	prospect	of	his	return	
to	power,	a	prospect	they	associated	with	stagnation	and	the	lack	
of	any	 lasting	guarantees	of	 rights	and	property.	The	Kremlin’s	
policy	of	consolidating	power,	mobilising	support	and	persecut-
ing	opponents	reached	its	climax	after	the	revolution	in	the	Kyiv	
Maidan	in	early	2014	and	the	escape	of	the	Ukrainian	president	
Viktor	Yanukovych,	developments	which	the	Kremlin	interpret-
ed	as	 foreshadowing	a	bottom-up	destabilisation	that	could	also	
affect	Russia.	 This	 consolidated	 the	 authoritarian	nature	 of	 the	
Russian	state,	but	at	the	same	time	made	the	leadership	hostage	
to	its	own	policy,	especially	the	decision	to	annex	Crimea,	which	
had	 far-reaching	 geopolitical,	 internal	 political	 and	 economic	
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consequences.	An	analysis	of	the	Russian	elite’s	present	condition	
–	the	‘late	Putin’	period	–	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	the	ruling	
team	is	unable	to	devise	or	implement	internal	reforms.	It	seems	
doomed	inertly	to	continue	its	current	policy,	which	contributes	
to	 Russia’s	 further	 economic	 and	 social	 degradation,	 and	 limits	
the	 set	 of	 instruments	 available	 to	 the	 leadership	 to	 repression	
and	military	action,	including	abroad.
The	purpose	of	 the	present	paper	 is	not	so	much	to	comprehen-
sively	discuss	the	system	of	power	in	Russia	as	to	present	its	cur-
rent	 condition	 after	 15	 years	 of	 Vladimir	 Putin’s	 rule.	 The	 first	
chapter	describes	 the	main	 features	of	 the	 system	of	power,	 its	
main	actors	and	decision-making	processes,	as	well	as	the	chal-
lenges	 generated	 by	 its	 internal	 specificity.	 The	 second	 chapter	
characterises	Russian	society	and	 its	role	 in	holding	the	system	
of	power	together.	The	final	chapter	attempts	to	outline	the	pros-
pects	of	the	system’s	further	development	(or	in	fact	degradation),	
and	the	potential	consequences	of	a	crisis	in	the	Putinist	system	
of	power.
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I. PutInISm: SucceSSIve StageS  
of authorItarIanISm
From	 the	 start,	 terminology	 associated	with	 authoritarian	 sys-
tems	 has	 been	 applied	 in	 describing	 Vladimir	 Putin’s	 rule,	 al-
though	the	notions	used	have	ranged	from	milder	ones	referring	
to	so-called	‘democracy	with	adjectives’	(controlled	or	façade	de-
mocracy)	 to	 terms	 directly	 referring	 to	 authoritarianism	 (e.g.	
electoral	authoritarianism,1	denoting	an	authoritarian	system	of	
power	that	derives	its	legitimacy	from	a	sham,	controlled	electoral	
process	that	does	not	lead	to	a	change	of	government).	The	Putinist	
system	of	government	has	from	its	beginning	been	characterised	
by	a	centralisation	and	personalisation	of	power,	restrictions	on	
political	pluralism	and	economic	competition,	selected	repression	
and	the	use	of	force	both	in	Russia	and	abroad,	as	well	as	ideologi-
cal	and	historical	manipulations	for	political	purposes.
In	recent	years,	however,	the	system	of	power	has	grown	increas-
ingly	 more	 authoritarian and repressive.	 This	 evolution	 is	
indicative	of	the	Kremlin’s	strategic	choice	made	in	the	wake	of	
the	 political	 experiment	 -	 Dmitry	Medvedev’s	 presidency.	 Dur-
ing	this	time,	the	main	features	of	the	Putinist	regime	continued	
but	the	style	of	governance	changed,	Vladimir	Putin’s	poll	show-
ings	declined,	and	groups	formed	within	the	political	elite	and	in	
the	general	public	which	voiced	their	expectations	of	liberalisa-
tion.	That	‘hard	line’,	which	was	adopted	in	order	to	remedy	the	
weakening	 of	Vladimir	 Putin’s	 legitimacy	 as	 the	 leader,	 proved	
that	the	Kremlin	had	chosen	the	path	of	authoritarian	consolida-
tion;	that	is,	it	had	decided	once	again	to	concentrate	the	formal	
decision-making	mechanisms	in	the	hands	of	 the	president	and	
pursue	a	policy	of	restrictions	towards	those	actors	who	did	not	
unconditionally	support	this	line.	This	was	chosen	instead	of	opt-
ing	 for	 an	 evolutionary	 variant,	 i.e.	 Medvedev’s	 re-election,	 as	
1	 See	inter alia	Grigory	Golosov,	Электоральный авторитаризм в России,	Pro 
et Contra,	January-February	2008.
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a	result	of	which	the	original	model	would	have	stayed	in	place,	
but	power	would	be	decentralised	and	split	among	the	different	
groups	within	the	elite	in	a	controlled	and	gradual	manner.	The	
process	 of authoritarian mobilisation gained	 momentum	 in	
the	wake	of	the	Kyiv	Maidan	in	winter	2014,	Russia’s	annexation	
of	Crimea,	the	conflict	in	eastern	Ukraine	and	the	confrontation	
with	the	West.
One	 of	 the	 main	 symptoms	 of	 the	 system’s	 evolution	 concerns	
the	substitution	of	the	main	source of the russian leader’s le-
gitimacy	–	the	devaluation	of	legal	(electoral)	legitimacy,	which	
was	dominant	during	Putin’s	first	two	terms	as	president,	in	fa-
vour	of	the	increasingly	dominant	charismatic legitimacy.	The	
president,	who	acted	as	the	key	decision	maker	even	beforehand,	
and	who	could	not	have	been	challenged	at	the	ballot	box	by	any	
other	politician,	is	currently	represented	as	the	sole	guarantor	of	
Russia’s	stability	and	integrity,	and	as	a	politician	endowed	with	
nearly	superhuman	powers.2
Another	stage	 in	 the	evolution	of	how	the	Russian	political re-
gime	derives	its	legitimacy	concerns	its	progressing ideologisa-
tion.	Previously,	the	regime	used	to	be	pragmatic	and	ideological-
ly	eclectic,	which	reflected	the	relative	pluralism	of	the	Russian	
elite.	However,	 since	Putin’s	return	 in	2012,	 the	Russian	 leader-
ship	has	stepped	up	efforts	 to	develop	a	 state	 ideology	based	on	
a	specific	version	of	conservatism	rooted	in	‘traditional’	Orthodox	
values.3	The	Kremlin’s	 conservatism	 is	 supposed	 to	 serve	as	 the	
regime’s	ideological	foundation	and	justify	the	preservation	of	the	
2	 Aired	on	public	television	on	26	April	2015,	the	documentary	The President. 
15 years of new Russia	creates	an	image	of	Putin	as	a	politician	who	has	saved	
Russia	from	poverty,	chaos	and	the	terrorist	threat	of	the	1990s,	who	single-
handedly	takes	all	the	key	decisions,	and	who	is	endowed	with	political	ge-
nius	and	other	exceptional	virtues.
3	 For	more	information,	see	Witold	Rodkiewicz,	Jadwiga	Rogoża,	Potemkin	
conservatism.	An	ideological	tool	of	the	Kremlin,	Point of View,	3	February	
2015,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2015-02-03/potem-
kin-conservatism-ideological-tool-kremlin
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‘traditional’	 (but	effectively	authoritarian)	model	of	governance	
in	Russia.	This	has	been	presented	as	an	alternative	to	the	liberal	
ideology	which,	 in	 the	Kremlin’s	view,	 is	 incompatible	with	 the	
Russian	reality,	and	as	a	justification	for	the	policy	of	confronta-
tion	with	 the	Western	world,	which	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 source	 of	
‘alien’	 values	 and	 an	 aggressor	 in	Russia’s	 sphere	 of	 vital	 inter-
ests.	 For	 the	needs	of	 the	 state	 ideology,	 the	Russian	 leadership	
and	 its	 loyal	 experts	 have	 also	 constructed	 a	 specific	 histori-
cal policy,	 wherein	 the	 interpretations	 of	 history	 are	 adjusted	
to	current	political	needs.	For	instance,	the	victory	over	fascism	
in	World	War	 II	 is	 juxtaposed	with	 the	present	Russian	aggres-
sion	in	Ukraine	where	Russia	is	allegedly	fighting	a	new	variety	
of	fascism,	and	a	manipulated	version	of	the	19th-century	Russian	
World	(Russkiy Mir)	concept	is	supposed	to	justify	the	cultural	and	
political	 dominance	 of	 Russia	 over	 Ukraine	 and	 Belarus.4	 This	
policy	also	generates	justifications	for	authoritarian	and	totalitar-
ian	rule,5	while	avoiding	any	re-evaluations	of	the	tragic	or	con-
troversial	chapters	of	Russia’s	history.
The	social contract between the leader and the public	has	also	
changed.	As	 the	 economic	 situation	has	 been	deteriorating,	 the	
Kremlin	is	no	longer	able	to	ensure	steadily	improving	standards	
of	living	for	the	people,	which	used	to	be	its	way	of	winning	the	
public’s	support	and	loyalty.	The	current	social	contract	could	be	
phrased	in	terms	of	‘sacrifices	in	return	for	heroism	and	a	sense	
of	dignity’.	The	leadership	has	been	trying	to	offset	the	sacrifices	
which	 the	Russians	have	been	 forced	 to	make	as	a	 result	of	 the	
4	 See	Marek	Menkiszak,	The	Putin	doctrine:	The	formation	of	a	conceptual	
framework	for	Russian	dominance	in	the	post-Soviet	area,	OSW Commen-
tary,	 27	 March	 2014,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-com-
mentary/2014-03-27/putin-doctrine-formation-a-conceptual-framework-
russian
5	 Even	though	Putin	has	formally	condemned	Stalin	as	a	criminal,	the	recent	
years	have	witnessed	an	apologia	for	Josef	Stalin	(tolerated	by	the	govern-
ment):	historians	with	close	links	to	the	leadership	have	been	presenting	him	
as	an	‘effective	manager’,	and	in	May	2015	a	monument	to	Stalin	was	erected	
in	the	town	of	Lipetsk	at	the	initiative	of	the	Communists.
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sanctions	and	economic	stagnation	by	resorting	to	an	authoritar-
ian	mobilisation	 fuelled	by	a	sense	of	 threat	 from	the	 ‘eternally	
hostile	West’	and	thriving	on	a	sense	of	pride	in	such	achievements	
as	the	‘regaining	of	Crimea’.	The	most	visible	element	of	this	mo-
bilisation	is	the	massive	wave	of	aggressive media propaganda	
which	is	extremely	biased,	exploits	hate	speech	and	resorts	to	dis-
information	techniques,	of	which	the	most	glaring	examples	can	
be	observed	in	connection	with	the	crisis	in	Ukraine.6	Despite	the	
objective	fact	that	the	people’s	standards	of	living	and	purchasing	
power	have	declined,	at	the	present	stage	that	propaganda	is	ca-
pable	of	generating	the	desired	outcomes	for	the	Kremlin,	boost-
ing	the	president’s	popularity	even	more	and	fanning	the	aversion	
towards	the	West.7
the evolution of the leader’s position in the system of power 
has been accompanied in recent years by changes in the presi-
dent’s inner circle.	Originally	consisting	of	several	mutually	bal-
anced	groups	with	diverse	backgrounds	and	interests,	it	has	now	
become	entirely	dominated	by	representatives	of	the	secret	ser-
vices	who	share	Putin’s	worldview	and	vision	of	the	threats	faced	
by	Russia.	The	narrow	group	in	charge	of	strategic	decisions,	such	
as	the	annexation	of	Crimea	and	the	policies	towards	Ukraine,	the	
Commonwealth	of	Independent	States	and	the	West	(for	example,	
the	counter-sanctions	against	the	states	which	have	imposed	eco-
nomic	 sanctions	on	Russia	or	banned	Russian	officials)	 consists	
6	 The	 extremely	 aggressive	 and	 emotional	mediatisation	 of	 stories	which	
would	then	turn	out	to	be	untrue,	such	as	the	reportage	broadcast	by	the	
main	TV	station,	1	Kanal,	on	12	July	2014,	showing	the	story	of	a	boy	from	
Slavyansk	reported	to	have	been	crucified	by	the	Ukrainian	military,	or	the	
practice	of	illustrating	reports	about	the	Ukrainian	army’s	alleged	atrocities	
with	materials	documenting	other	conflicts,	etc.
7	 The	president’s	popularity	reached	89%	in	June	2015	(according	to	the	Levada	
Centre	poll	of	24	June	2015).	According	to	other	polls	by	the	Levada	Centre,	
62%	of	Russians	believe	that	Russia’s	relations	with	the	West	“will	always	be	
based	on	mutual	distrust”	(26	June	2015);	66%	of	respondents	believe	that	the	
objective	of	the	Western	sanctions	is	to	“weaken	and	humiliate	Russia”,	and	
70%	believe	that	Russia	should	not	pay	heed	to	the	sanctions	and	continue	
with	its	own	policy	(29	June	2015).
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almost	exclusively	of	members	of	the	secret	services.	In	the	after-
math	of	a	series	of	reshuffles	 in	 the	President’s	Administration,	
the	secret	services	have	become	the	main,	or	even	the	sole	pro-
vider	of	information	to	the	president,	and	have	been	reinforcing	
Putin’s	vision	of	the	world	(e.g.	with	regard	to	the	West’s	hostile	
policy	towards	Russia)	while	at	the	same	time	shaping	his	current	
orientation	in	keeping	with	their	own	sectorial	interests.	This	has	
made	the main	decision maker increasingly isolated in terms 
of access to information,	 as	 the	 services	 have	 been	 providing	
the	president	with	a	selective	view	of	the	world	largely	driven	by	
wishful	thinking.	The	secret	services’	monopoly	on	information	
reinforces	 the	Kremlin’s	vision	and	 its	 geopolitical	priorities	by	
representing	 the	Western	world	 as	 an	 eternal	 enemy	 intent	 on	
undermining	or	even	destroying	Russia.8	Those	perceptions	have	
overshadowed	any	economic	calculations,	also	with	regard	to	de-
cisions	whose	consequences	affect	the	condition	of	the	entire	state	
(since	the	annexation	of	Crimea,	the	Russian	economy	has	practi-
cally	been	hostage	to	geopolitical	decisions).	The	decision-making	
processes	habitually	entail	negative	side-effects,	which	in	them-
selves	require	the	development	of	remedial	strategies.	The	secret	
services	have	also	been	manning	the	president’s	main	organisa-
tional	 staff,	 fully	controlling	his	daily	 functioning,	personal	re-
lations	and	physical	security.	This	has	 left	 the	president	 largely	
a	hostage to the security service people around him,	quite	in	
contrast	to	the	impression	of	one-man	leadership	that	he	has	been	
ostensibly	making,	and	 the	undisputed	 fact	 that	 the	main	deci-
sion-making	mechanisms	are	concentrated	in	his	hands.	
At	the	same	time,	the	president	has	been	increasingly	alienated	
from the broader political and business elites. Putin	has	been	
emphasising	 the	 single-handed	 nature	 of	 important	 decisions	
ever	 more	 frequently,	 often	 confronting	 his	 own	 political	 and	
8	 Nikolai	Patrushev,	secretary	of	the	Security	Council	of	the	Russian	Federa-
tion,	said	that	the	United	States	“wished	Russia	to	cease	to	exist	as	a	state”.	
Interview	 for	 the	Kommersant daily,	 22	 June	2015,	www.kommersant.ru/
doc/2752246
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business	base	with	accomplished	facts	and	in	some	cases	taking	
decisions	that	have	adversely	affected	the	interests	of	that	base.9	
The	elite	groups	 in	question,	 i.e.	members	of	 the	state	adminis-
tration,	 business	 and	 expert	 and	 research	 communities,	 have	
lost	 their	 influence	 on	 the	 decision-making	 processes	 concern-
ing	 strategic	 issues	 or	matters	 affecting	 their	 own	position	 and	
well-being.10	Most	people	in	these	groups	(including	the	Sberbank	
CEO	German	Gref,	the	economic	advisor	and	former	deputy	prime	
minister	Alexei	Kudrin,	and	the	Central	Bank	governor	Elvira	Na-
byullina)	have	kept	their	jobs,	but	their	role	is	currently	limited	to	
executing	the	Kremlin’s	political	directives	and	developing	tactics	
to	 implement	strategies	 that	have	already	been	decided.	This	 il-
lustrates	 the	 change	 that	has	occurred	 in	 the	general	nature	of	
the	Kremlin’s relations with the broader elites –	whereby	posi-
tive	instruments	(distribution	of	assets	and	promotions,	guaran-
tees	 of	 immunity)	 have	 been	 replaced	 by	 negative	 instruments	
(demonstrations	of	power,	disciplining	measures,	selective	pun-
ishments).	Moderate	members	of	the	elite	who	do	not	support	the	
Kremlin’s	aggressive	policy	unconditionally	have	been	dismissed	
as	a	 ‘sixth column’11	whose	 loyalty	 to	Russia	has	allegedly	been	
9	 The	policy	of	so-called	‘nationalisation	of	elites’	may	serve	as	an	example	
here;	this	aims	to	step	up	the	Kremlin’s	control	of	the	property	and	private	
lives	of	members	of	the	administration	and	business,	for	example	by	prohib-
iting	officials	and	employees	of	state-owned	corporations	from	holding	for-
eign	banking	accounts;	imposing	stricter	requirements	concerning	personal	
property	declarations;	the	creation	within	the	President’s	Administration	of	
a	register	of	assets	held	by	the	elite	and	financial	flows	to	other	countries,	etc.	
For	more	information,	see	Jadwiga	Rogoża,	The	nationalisation	of	the	elite:	
Kremlin	tracking	officials’	foreign	assets,	OSW Analysis,	10	April	2013,	http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-04-10/nationalisation-elite-
kremlin-tracking-officials-foreign-assets
10	 The	elite	has	suffered	various	negative	consequences	of	the	decision	to	annex	
Crimea,	which	hit	at	its	economic	interest	and	position	in	the	West,	where	
most	of	the	elite	members	have	been	investing	their	capital,	where	their	
families	have	been	living	and	where	their	children	have	been	going	to	school.
11	 This	term	was	coined	by	Alexander	Dugin,	the	ideologue	with	close	links	to	
the	Kremlin,	who	said	that	the	“sixth	column”	consisted	of	“those	members	of	
the	Russian	leadership	who	support	Putin	but	at	the	same	time	call	for	a	lib-
eral,	pro-Western,	modernised	and	Westernised	Russia,	for	globalisation,	
integration	with	the	Western	world	and	European	values	and	institutions,	
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eroded	by	its	extensive	economic	ties	with	the	West.	All	this	has	
affected	the	attitudes	of	these	elites	and	the	quality	of	their	sup-
port	for	the	state	leader.	Over	the	last	three	years	(and	especially	
since	the	annexation	of	Crimea)	many	representatives	of	this	elite	
have	openly	voiced	concern	over	the	Kremlin’s	 increasingly	un-
predictable	policy	and	its	harmful	effects	on	the	condition	of	the	
Russian	 economy	–	 and	on	 their	 own	personal	 interests.12	Once	
Vladimir	 Putin’s	 convinced	 and	 ardent	 supporters,	 they	 have	
gradually	become	hostages	to	the	evolving	regime	which	–	while	
still	rewarding	them	with	profits	–	has	become	increasingly	pre-
carious.
The	president’s	progressing	alienation	has	been	accompanied	by	
a	drastic	narrowing	of	 the	 limits	of	 that	political	 and	 social	 ac-
tivity	that	remains	uncontrolled	by	the	Kremlin.	The	regime	has 
increasingly been penalising any opposition or independent 
social and political activity,	starting	from	the	condemnation	of	
opponents	as	a	 ‘fifth	column’	or	 ‘foreign	agents’,13	 to	persecution	
and	 repression	 (a	 larger	number	of	 custodial	 sentences,	 includ-
ing	 for	 participation	 in	 opposition	demonstrations),	 all	 the	way	
up	to	political	assassinations	(the	murder	of	Boris	Nemtsov	by	the	
Kremlin	wall	in	February	2015,	perpetrated	by	people	with	links	
to	the	Chechen	leader	Ramzan	Kadyrov).	The	limits	of	the	freedom	
of	speech	have	narrowed	down	drastically,	especially	in	relation	
and	who	want	Russia	to	become	a	prospering	corporation	in	a	world	in	which	
the	rules	are	set	by	the	global	West”.	See	A.	Dugin,	Шестая колонна,	http://
vz.ru/opinions/2014/4/29/684247.html.
12	 The	Sberbank	CEO	German	Gref,	the	economy	minister	Alexei	Ulyukayev,	
CEOs	of	private	corporations	and	even	lobbyists	in	friendly	relations	with	
Putin,	such	as	Gennady	Timchenko.	Even	lobbyists	closely	associated	with	
Putin,	who	have	been	beneficiaries	of	the	Kremlin’s	decisions	for	many	years,	
have	now	been	pushed	into	subordinate	positions	(Yuri	Kovalchuk,	Arkady	
Rotenberg,	Vladimir	Yakunin,	and	even	Igor	Sechin);	the	Kremlin	keeps	sup-
porting	them	financially,	but	the	president	ever	more	frequently	reprimands	
them	publicly	in	order	to	remind	them	of	their	‘vassal’	status.
13	 The	terms	‘fifth	column’	and	‘traitors	of	the	nation’	were	used	by	President	
Putin	himself	in	his	address	to	the	Federal	Assembly	on	18	March	2014;	http://
kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603
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to	 the	sphere	of	online	 information,	which	had	previously	been	
unfettered.14	 In	addition	 to	curbing	political	and	civil	 freedoms,	
the	regime	has	also	started	to	systematically	restrain individual 
freedoms and encroach on the sphere of public morals.15
As	the	system	has	been	evolving,	so	its	modus operandi	has	been	
changing.	 The	 leadership	 has	 increasingly	 resorted	 to	 ‘manual 
control’ mode	(which	had	existed	since	the	start	of	Putin’s	rule)	
in	state	governance.	The	centralisation	of	power	and	the	Krem-
lin’s	drive	to	control	the	main	aspects	of	public	life	has	led	to	iner-
tia	in	the	institutions	responsible	for	the	functioning	of	the	state,	
which	 have	 become	 ‘service	 providers’	 to	 the	 Kremlin.	 Against	
this	backdrop,	the	presidential	team	(and	the	President’s	Admin-
istration	in	the	institutional	dimension)	appears	to	be	relatively	
effective,16	although	it	also	tends	to	become	chaotic	in	crisis	situa-
tions	(such	as	the	currency	crisis	in	December	2014),	while	many	
presidential	 decrees	 are	 implemented	 in	 a	 dilatory	 manner	 or	
even	obstructed.	As	a	result,	 the	Kremlin	needs	 to	 intervene	 in	
every	important	case	in	order	to	ensure	that	its	decisions	are	im-
plemented.	This	 ‘achievement’	of	the	Russian	power	system,	i.e.	
the	fact	that	the	Kremlin	now	controls	all	the	important	actors	of	
public	life,	is	at	the	same	time	one	of	its	main	disadvantages:	with-
14	 Bloggers	are	now	legally	required	to	reveal	their	personal	data	and	comply	
with	a	set	of	restrictive	laws.	Structures	with	close	links	to	the	Kremlin	have	
taken	over	control	of	Russia’s	largest	social	network	Vkontakte,	and	many	
popular	portals	have	been	forced	to	change	their	editorial	policies	(Gazeta.
ru,	Lenta.ru	and	others).	The	independent	online	television	Dozhd	has	faced	
persecution,	and	a	number	of	popular	opposition	portals	(Grani.ru,	Ej.ru,	
Kasparov.ru,	Alexei	Navalny’s	blog)	have	been	blocked	by	the	governmental	
Roskomnadzor	service.
15	 The	law	now	requires	everyone	to	declare	dual	citizenships	and	register	their	
residence.	Not	only	opposition	activists	but	also	ordinary	citizens	are	per-
secuted	for	expressing	critical	opinions	of	the	government	or	taking	part	in	
protests.	Finally,	sexual	minorities	have	also	faced	persecution	instigated	by	
the	authorities.
16	 Vladimir	Putin	himself	tries	to	strengthen	this	impression;	for	instance	in	
the	TV	documentary	Crimea. The road to the homeland	broadcast	on	the	anni-
versary	of	the	peninsula’s	annexation,	he	explained	the	success	of	that	opera-
tion	by	the	fact	that	he	had	personally	controlled	every	step	of	the	process.
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out	the	leader’s	involvement	the	system	erodes	and	becomes	inert,	
while	the	weakness,	or	perceived	weakness,	of	the	leader	becomes	
a	fatal	signal	for	the	entire	system,	demonstrating	how	fragile	the	
‘stability’	under	Putin	is.17	The	fact	that	the	system	is	based	on	in-
formal rules not grounded in law and on personal relations 
and arrangements has	 likewise	been	a	double-edged	sword	for	
the	 ruling	 team.	 It	means	 that	 there	 are	no	 reliable	guarantees	
of	the	rights	of	citizens,	political	actors	and	economic	operators,	
and	the	institutions	appointed	to	defend	those	rights	are	a	mere	
facade.	This	has	enabled	the	Kremlin	to	arbitrarily	‘manage’	those	
guarantees	because,	in	the	absence	of	definitive	legal	guarantees	
of	 the	oligarchs’	property	rights,	 they	remain	dependent	on	the	
political	 leadership,	 and	 the	 recurrent	 ‘redistributions’	 of	 their	
assets	remind	them	of	this	dependence.18	However,	such	a	system	
does	not	offer	any	reliable	guarantees	to	the	members	of	the	nar-
row	ruling	elite,	 either.	For	 them,	giving	up	power	means	 risk-
ing	their	assets,	sometimes	their	freedom,	and	in	extreme	cases	
even	their	lives.	This	situation	has	affected	the	crucially	impor-
tant	process	of	the	succession of power,	which	in	this	paradigm	
is	perceived	as	a	risk	factor.	As	the	reactive	policy	that	followed	
Dmitry	 Medvedev’s	 short	 presidency	 demonstrated,	 even	 ‘con-
trolled	 succession’	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 risk;	 the	 potential	 emancipation	
of	 the	new	president	would	have	entailed	painful	 losses	 for	 the	
group	 ceding	power.	As	 a	natural	 consequence	of	 this,	 those	 in	
power	seek	to	stay	there	using	any	means	available,	which	over	
17	 In	this	context,	the	ten-day	pause	in	the	president’s	public	appearances	in	
March	2015	triggered	a	wave	of	speculations	and	undermined	the	sense	of	
stability	in	the	ruling	camp.	See	also	Lilia	Shevtsova,	Has	the	Russian	Sys-
tem’s	Agony	Begun?,	The National Interest,	17	March	2015,	http://www.the-
american-interest.com/2015/03/17/has-russias-agony-begun	
18	 For	example	the	takeovers,	under	legal	pretexts,	of	the	business	empires	
owned	by	Vladimir	Gusinsky	(2000),	Mikhail	Khodorkovsky	(after	2003)	
or	more	recently,	Vladimir	Yevtushenkov	(2014).	Vladislav	Inozemtsev	has	
termed	the	Putinist	stabilisation	‘the	stability	of	the	time-limited’	(«cтабиль-
ность временщиков»)	because	it	has	created	a	group	of	people	in	power	and	
a	class	of	property	holders,	but	has	failed	to	create	mechanisms	to	guaran-
tee	their	property	rights.	W.	 Inozemtsev,	Распад стабильности,	snob.ru,	
10	March	2015.
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time	degrades	the	quality	of	governance	and	leads	the	regime	to	
evolve	towards	dictatorship.
In	the	economic	dimension,	the	Putinist	system	–	with	its	central-
isation	of	decision-making,	the	politicisation	of	the	economy	and	
the	 suppression	of	 competition	–	has	 led	 to	a	 situation	 is	which	
the economic model based on revenues from energy resources 
has reached the limits of its potential, while	no	new	model	that	
could	replace	it	and	ensure	further	growth	for	the	Russian	econ-
omy	has	been	proposed.	For	around	a	decade,	the	Russian	econo-
my	grew	dynamically	owing	to	the	high	and	constantly	rising	oil	
prices.19	This	model	started	to	crumble	around	2012,	with	oil	pric-
es	still	peaking	(a	yearly	average	of	US$100	per	barrel)	but	growth	
slowly	decreasing.	In	2012	the	Russian	GDP	grew	by	3.4%	(down	
from	4.3%	in	2011),	by	1.3%	in	2013,	and	by	0.6%	in	2014,	and	Russia	
is	expected	to	close	2015	with	its	GDP	smaller	by	several	percent.	
This	slowdown	is	mainly	due	to	many years of structural ne-
glect:	the	failure	to	diversify	the	economy	(since	the	start	of	Pu-
tin’s	rule,	the	Russian	economy’s	dependence	on	the	raw	materials	
sectors	has	 increased	considerably20),	 the	support	and	subsidies	
provided	 to	 many	 unprofitable	 enterprises;	 a	 poor	 investment	
climate;	 the	 weakness	 of	 institutions	 (including	 the	 judiciary);	
the	lack	of	property	right	guarantees,	which	has	weighed	on	the	
development	of	entrepreneurship;	and	finally,	 the	 technological	
backwardness	which	has	exacerbated	the	unprofitability	and	un-
competitiveness	 of	 production	 in	many	 sectors	 of	 the	 economy	
and	made	them	more	dependent	on	imports.
19	 Russia’s	GDP	 grew	by	 10%	 in	 2000	 (with	 the	 average	 annual	 oil	 price	 at	
US$23.9	per	barrel),	5.1%	in	2001	(US$20.8),	4.7%	in	2002	(US$21.02),	7.3%	in	
2003	(US$23.81),	7.2%	in	2004	(US$31),	6.4%	in	2005	(US$45.2),	8.5%	in	2007	
(US$64.3). In	the	years	2012–2013	the	price	of	oil	was	above	US$100.	www.cbr.
ru/statistics/credit_statistics/print.aspx?file=crude_oil.htm
20	 During	Putin’s	rule,	the	share	of	revenue	from	oil	and	gas	exports	in	the	
Russian	budget	expanded	from	18%	in	1999	to	54.5%	in	2011;	according	to	the	
Ministry	of	Energy,	in	2014	it	was	52%.
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Underlying	those	problems	is	the	fundamental	principle	on	which	
the	Putinist	system	rests,	i.e.	the	primacy of control over devel-
opment.	Since	2000,	the	Kremlin	has	consistently	centralised	the	
decision-making	processes,	and	limited	competition	and	the	auton-
omy	of	other	actors	(whether	political,	business	or	social),	while	at	
the	same	time	promoting	attitudes	of	passive	loyalty	without	 ‘ex-
cessive’	initiative.	Many	years	of	such	negative	selection	of	the	state	
cadres	have	resulted	in	a	poor	level	of	governance	at	the	federal	and	
regional	 levels,	and	 inertia	and	 incompetence	 in	 the	administra-
tion.	This	has	lowered	the	quality	of	many	strategic	decisions,	and	
derailed	even	those	rare	attempts	at	reform	or	modernisation	that	
the	Russian	 leadership	undertook	 in	 the	 last	 15	years.	Active	and	
innovative	 groups	 have	 been	 denied	 promotions	 and	 opportuni-
ties	to	develop,	which	has	resulted	in	a	permanent	flight	of	capital	
(which	reached	record	levels	in	2014)	and	a	brain	drain,	depriving	
the	system	of	its	most	creative	members.21	This	has	led	to	a	gradual	
intellectual degradation of the system,	which	has	been	taking	
advantage	of	the	favourable	economic	situation,	but	has	ceased	to	
generate	the	new	ideas	and	technologies	which	determine	the	posi-
tion	of	states	on	the	global	stage	today.	Since	mid-2014	those	long-
term	internal	problems	have	been	exacerbated	by	adverse	external	
factors,	including	falling	global	oil	prices,	the	related	depreciation	
of	the	rouble,	and	the	impact	of	Western	sanctions,	which	have	ex-
posed	the	fragility	of	the	Russian	economy	and	its	dependence	on	
the	fluctuations	of	the	economic	situation.
The	collapse	of	the	welfare state model in	Russia,	which	used	to	
be	presented	in	the	Kremlin’s	propaganda	as	one	of	Russia’s	great-
est	achievements	throughout	Putin’s	rule,	marks	another	socially	
painful	 failure	 of	 the	 Putinist	 system,	 and	 runs	 counter	 to	 the	
triumphalist	 propaganda	 of	 ‘Russia	 rising	 from	 its	 knees’.	 Ris-
ing	standards	of	living	(and	more	broadly,	economic,	political	and	
21	 The	flight	of	capital	from	Russia	in	2014	increased	two	and	a	half	times	com-
pared	to	2013	as	its	volume	exceeded	US$150	billion	(figures	from	the	Central	
Bank;	US$61	billion	in	2013);	emigration	has	also	reached	record	levels.
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social	stability)	were	the	cornerstones	of	the	Russian	social	contract	
since	Vladimir	Putin	came	to	power.	Drastically	low	in	the	1990s,	
those	standards	of	living	then	improved	considerably;	during	the	
first	decade	of	Putin’s	rule	GDP	per capita	 increased	fourfold,	and	
the	people’s	real	incomes	grew	year	on	year.22	Despite	that,	Russia	
continues	to	struggle	with	the	inefficiency	of	the	state	institutions	
in	 charge	 of	 providing	 social	 services,	 i.e.	 healthcare,	 education	
and	research,	and	municipal	infrastructures,	which	are	in	deplor-
able	condition,	especially	outside	the	large	cities.23	The	scale	of	the	
unsolved	 problems	 reveals	 itself,	 for	 instance,	 in	 the	 president’s	
annual	televised	conferences	with	the	inhabitants	of	the	Russian	
regions,	 which	 despite	 the	 television	 programmers’	 censorship	
present	a	picture	of	a	society	struggling	with	basic	social	and	in-
frastructural	problems	that	have	not	changed	for	years,	and	with	
the	corruption	and	 lawlessness	of	state	officials	and	 law	enforce-
ment	functionaries.	Those	problems	are	 largely	a	consequence	of	
the	Kremlin’s	strategic	decisions,	such	as	the	2001	financial	reform	
which	transferred	a	considerable	portion	of	the	revenues	of	region-
al	budgets	(responsible	for	managing	the	social	infrastructure)	to	
the	central	budget,	the	tolerance	of	corruption,	and	the	incompe-
tence	of	those	in	charge.	Social	spending	(on	education,	healthcare,	
culture)	 in	 the	 central	 budget	 has	 also	 been	 cut	 in	 recent	 years,	
which	 stands in contrast to the constant growth of security 
and defence spending	 (which	accounted	 for	40%	of	 total	budget	
spending	in	2015,	compared	to	30%	for	social	spending)24.
22	 Nominal	GDP	per capita	increased	from	US$5914	in	1999	to	US$24,083	in	2012	
(and	based	on	purchasing	power	parity,	from	US$4200	in	1999	to	US$18,000	
in	2012),	while	average	nominal	income	per capita	increased	from	2281	roubles	
in	2000	to	38,340	roubles	in	2013.	
23	 Last	year,	the	numbers	of	healthcare	establishments	in	several	dozen	Rus-
sian	regions	were	reduced	as	part	of	an	‘optimisation’	operation	that	sparked	
an	outcry	in	Russia.	For	more	information,	see	http://www.gazeta.ru/so-
cial/2013/02/22/4978173.shtml
24	 Ewa	Fischer,	Amendment	to	the	Russian	budget	for	2015:	an	attempt	to	main-
tain	the	status	quo,	OSW Analysis,	18	March	2015,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/analyses/2015-03-18/amendment-to-russian-budget-2015-at-
tempt-to-maintain-status-quo	
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II. a SocIety of obServerS – the factor that 
KeePS the regIme together
The	 specific	 nature	 of	 the	 Russian	 society,	 and	 especially	 the	
weakness	of	civic	institutions,	is	one	of	the	main	pillars	sustaining	
the	viability	of	the	current	regime.	Civil	society	institutions	that	
could	provide	a	counterbalance	to	the	state	and	supervise	those	in	
power	have	not	developed	 in	post-Soviet	Russia,	despite	 several	
attempts	to	create	them.	This	is	a	legacy	of	the	many	centuries	of	
authoritarian	state	models	in	which	society	was	reduced	to	a	mere	
object,	and	its	public	activity	was	usually	limited	to	uncontrolled	
and	destructive	outbreaks	of	anger	that	failed	to	improve	its	over-
all	situation.25	Up	to	the	present	day,	the	Russian	leadership	has	an	
extensive	set	of	instruments	at	its	disposal	to	influence	and	ma-
nipulate	the	public.	Firstly,	they	hold	the	systemic	and	economic	
tools,	including	the	existence	of	an	extensive	public	sector26;	the	
state	 is	 the	 largest	employer	 in	Russia,	which	makes	it	easier	to	
co-ordinate	and	control	the	political	behaviour	of	a	large	segment	
of	the	public	(and	public	sector	employees	are	indeed	considered	
to	be	a	bastion	of	the	ruling	group).	Secondly,	the	Russian	leader-
ship	has	effective	propaganda	instruments	at	its	disposal,	includ-
ing	the	state-controlled	media,	especially	television,27	which	feed	
the	people	both	political	propaganda	and	sensational	&	entertain-
ment	content	that	‘hypnotises’	the	audience	and	reinforces	its	at-
titude	as	passive	observers	of	events.28
25	 Alexander	Pushkin	had	already	defined	it	accurately	in	the	nineteenth	cen-
tury:	“God	save	us	from	seeing	a	Russian	revolt	–	senseless	and	merciless”.
26	 The	Russian	public	sector	employs	14.5	million	people	(more	than	20%	of	the	
entire	working	population),	of	which	3.3	million	people	work	in	the	federal	
institutions	(2014,	novainfo.ru/archive/24/sovershenstvovanie-oplaty-tru-
da).	The	numbers	are	even	bigger	if	we	include	the	related	sectors	that	benefit	
from	public	funding.
27	 Television	is	 the	main	source	of	 information	about	Russia	and	the	world	
for	90%	of	Russians	(according	to	a	Levada	poll,	June	2014).	This	percentage	
showed	a	downward	trend	in	the	years	2010-2013,	but	increased	again	after	
the	annexation	of	Crimea.
28	 The	diagnosis	was	formulated	in	2001	by	the	leading	Russian	sociologists	
Dmitry	Gudkov	and	Boris	Dubin	of	the	Levada	Centre,	in	their	paper	entitled	
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The	 Russian	 public’s	 great	 susceptibility	 to	 the	 Kremlin’s	 ma-
nipulation,	as	observed	in	the	course	of	last	year,	stems	from	the	
still	extant	post-imperial complex	and	the	trauma	of	the	Soviet	
Union’s	collapse,	which	for	many	Russians	meant	a	 loss	of	 iden-
tity	and	their	sense	of	security,	and	which	Putin	once	described	
as	the	greatest	geopolitical	catastrophe	of	the	twentieth	century.	
The	Soviet	mentality	can	be	easily	reanimated,	as	demonstrated	
by	the	Russian	leadership’s	success	in	reviving	the	attitudes,	prac-
tices	and	even	aesthetics	typical	of	the	Soviet	period.	The	develop-
ment	of	a	democratic	state	model	has	also	been	 impeded	by	 the	
fact	that	Western	values,	such	as	democracy	and	the	market	econ-
omy,	were	discredited	in	the	eyes	of	the	public	during	the	1990s.	
The	activities	of	the	then-leaders	of	Russia,	who	invoked	democ-
racy	but	in	fact	oversaw	the	privatisation	of	the	state	by	the	elite	
and	groups	associated	with	it,	created	a	caricature	of	democracy,	
which	most	Russians	still	associate	with	poverty,	chaos,	corrup-
tion	and	the	unbridled	development	of	criminal	structures,	and	
with	the	state’s	failure	to	deliver	on	its	basic	social	commitments.	
The	Kremlin	has	been	skilfully	taking	advantage	of	those	percep-
tions	by	emphasising	the	harmfulness	of	‘transplanting’	Western	
models	 to	 Russia,	 and	 championing	 a	 specifically	 Russian	 path	
of	development.	The	Russian	 leadership’s	main	postulate	 in	this	
context	has	concerned	 the	need	 to	preserve	traditionally rus-
sian social and political values,	a	move	intended	indirectly	to	
legitimise	the	traditionalist,	authoritarian	model	of	government.
Other	factors	that	have	contributed	to	the	persistence	of	the	au-
thoritarian	model	 in	 Russia	 concern	 the	 negative	 attitudes	 and	
behaviour	patterns	rooted	in	Russian	society,	 i.e.	 the	passivity, 
atomisation, mutual distrust and the lack of horizontal so-
cial ties that	could	give	rise	to	lasting	civil	society	structures.29	
A	society	of	television	viewers,	http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/197/991/1219/05
gudkov-31-45.pdf.
29	 See	inter alia	Alexei	Levinson,	Боюсь не успеть,	Неприкосновенный Запас	
6/2014.
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This	tragic	legacy	derives	at	least	from	the	events	of	the	twentieth	
century	and	its	repressions	and	wars,	which	have	brought	about	
a	negative	social	selection,	cutting	people	off	from	their	roots	and	
instilling	a	sense	of	helplessness	in	the	face	of	history,	reinforced	
by	the	violent	historical	upheavals	which	nearly	every	generation	
experienced.	Most	Russians	display	low	political	awareness	and	
passiveness	in	the	political	and	professional	spheres,	helplessness	
and	disbelief	 that	 their	 endeavours	 could	 be	 successful	 (‘I	 can’t	
change	anything’),	and	do	not	have	the	skills	 to	 take	grassroots	
action	and	co-operate	with	other	people	with	similar	interests	or	
problems.	This	 ‘silent majority’ in	Russia	 is	a	pillar	of	the	gov-
ernment’s	power.	In	fact,	what	keeps	the	system	together	is	not	so	
much	people’s	active,	enthusiastic	support	for	the	leadership,	as	
apathy	and	lack	of	social	involvement	in	any	processes	beyond	the	
private	sphere.	This	attitude	has	enabled	the	government	to	shape	
policy	on	its	own.30	This	social	apathy	has	also	damped	down	the	
Russians’	genuine	frustration	with	the	problems	they	face	in	eve-
ryday	life:	the	low	quality	of	healthcare,	social	security	and	edu-
cation,	the	condition	of	the	infrastructure	and	other	issues.	This	
frustration	has	not	translated	into	mass	protests	or	grassroots	ac-
tion	for	change;	rather,	it	has	prompted	the	Russians	to	seek	indi-
vidual	and	ad hoc	ways	of	dealing	with	the	problems.	Therefore,	
the	claims	that	social	unrest	could	erupt	in	Russia	if	the	economic	
situation	deteriorates	are	disputable,	as	demonstrated	by	the	way	
the	previous	economic	crisis	in	the	years	2008–2009	unfolded.	At	
that	time,	despite	the	economic	decline	that	left	large	industrial	
plants	 in	trouble,	only	 isolated	social	protests	 took	place	 (e.g.	 in	
the	town	of	Pikalyovo),	which	the	authorities	were	easily	able	to	
deal	with.
In	this	context,	it	should	not	be	overlooked	that	social	apathy	also	
entails	 some	 negative	 consequences	 for	 the	 government.	While	
the	popularity	showings	of	the	Russian	leadership	and	especially	
30	 See	Vladislav	Inozemtsev,	Секрет путинского консенсуса,	snob.ru,	11	Febru-
ary	2015.
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the	 president	 are	 high,	 the	quality of the people’s support is 
questionable;	it	is	usually	passive,	and	does	not	mobilise	people	
into	 getting	 actively	 involved	 in	 pro-Kremlin	 initiatives,	 so	 the	
state	structures	have	to	make	a	major	effort	each	time	they	need	
such	involvement.31	 In	the	event	of	major	problems	or	a	crisis	in	
the	Kremlin,	Vladimir	Putin’s	record	popularity	showings	of	over	
80%	will	 not	 translate	 into	 tangible	 support	 from	his	 backers.32	
Russian	society	has	also	demonstrated	a	tendency	to	easily	divert	
its	 sympathies	 to	politicians	or	 groups	 that	 appear	 to	be	 strong	
and	project	self-confidence	at	a	given	moment,	which	also	applied	
to	opposition	forces	at	those	times	when	they	seemed	to	be	gain-
ing	power.33	While	the	recent	wave	of	repression	against	the	op-
position	has	succeeded	in	restoring	the	impression	of	the	Krem-
lin’s	strength,	and	in	attracting	people	back	to	the	ruling	camp,	
this	very	fact	proves	that	social	sympathies	are	likely	to	follow	the	
course	of	developments,	rather	than	shape	them.
A	study	of	the	more	active	groups	of	Russian	society	with	higher	
social	capital	and	 intellectual	potential	also	 leads	 to	 the	conclu-
sion	that	the	expectations	of	political	and	systemic	change	within	
them	are	very	 limited.	These	groups,	which	could	be	defined	in	
31	 For	instance,	at	the	peak	of	the	anti-Kremlin	protests	in	2011-2012	the	au-
thorities	faced	considerable	difficulty	in	organising	counter-demonstrations	
to	express	support	for	Vladimir	Putin;	participants	in	pro-Putin	actions	had	
to	be	brought	to	the	rallies	in	buses	and	paid	to	participate,	and	their	behav-
iour	at	the	rallies	was	passive.
32	 As	Lilia	Shevtsova	noted,	Putin’s	ten-day	disappearance	in	March	2015	caused	
much	concern	in	the	state	administration	and	expert	communities	but	did	
not	trigger	any	major	reaction	among	the	wider	public,	which	may	mean	that	
the	public	will	behave	in	a	similar	way	in	the	event	the	president’s	position	
weakens	or	falters.	See:	Has	the	Russian	System’s	Agony	Begun?,	ibidem.
33	 In	2011,	as	the	pro-Kremlin	political	forces	were	losing	their	support	(espe-
cially	the	United	Russia	party),	and	the	anti-Kremlin	protests,	whose	partici-
pants	were	mostly	young	people,	were	gaining	momentum,	the	public	senti-
ments	started	to	turn	towards	the	opposition;	around	40%	of	people	supported	
the	protesters	 (see	http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2012/12/13_a_4889485.
shtml).	Another	evidence	of	this	is.	Alexei	Navalny’s	result	in	the	2013	elec-
tions	for	mayor	of	Moscow:	after	a	dynamic	and	charismatic	campaign,	Na-
valny	managed	to	garner	nearly	30%	of	votes	(his	real	showing	was	probably	
even	better).
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simplified	 terms	as	urban middle class	 and	which	 account	 for	
around	 15–18%	 of	 the	 population,34	 formed	 the	 core	 of	 the	 anti-
Kremlin	protests	in	2011–2012.	Those	protests	showed	that	there	
were	groups	in	Russian	society	which	had	adopted	attitudes	and	
values	typical	of	modern	societies,	which	in	turn	warranted	a	be-
lief	 that	 the	middle	 classes	 could	 be	 the	 vectors	 of	 a	 new,	 non-
Soviet	awareness	and	political	culture,	and	could	be	the	subjects	
of	modernisation.35	However,	 a	 closer	 look	 at	 the	 values	 and	 at-
titudes	of	the	Russian	middle	class	revealed	that	its	expectations	
concerning	change	were	very	limited,	and	reform	of	the	political	
sphere	played	only	a	minor	role	 in	 them.	The	middle	class	 is	as	
diverse	in	terms	of	values	as	Russian	society	is	as	a	whole.	Values	
typical	 of	modern	 societies	 (self-reliance,	 individualism,	 enter-
prise,	rationality,	respect	for	private	property)	coexist	with	values	
found	in	traditionalist	and	patriarchal	societies,	such	as	the	need	
for	a	strong	state	and	an	equal	distribution	of	goods.	The	political	
norms	and	values	held	by	the	Russian	middle	class	differ	consid-
erably	from	those	held	in	the	West	(for	instance,	researchers	have	
pointed	to	legal	nihilism	in	Russia,	among	other	factors),	and	even	
the	idea	of	rapprochement	with	the	West	is	not	a	priority.36
34	 The	Russian	middle	class	on	the	most-desired	direction	of	the	state’s	develop-
ment:	research	project	by	Svetlana	Mareyeva,	Institute	of	Sociology,	Russian	
Academy	of	Sciences,	http://www.opec.ru/1813805.html.	The	classification	
methodology	was	 based	 on	 four	 criteria:	 education,	 professional	 status,	
wealth	and	self-identification.
35	 See	inter alia	Natalia	Tikhonova,	Institute	of	Sociology,	Russian	Academy	of	
Sciences,	The	middle	class	as	the	subject	of	Russia’s	modernisation,	www.
lawinrussia.ru/srednii-klass-kak-subekt-modernizatsii-rossi
36	 Tikhonova,	Mareyeva,	op. cit.	Mareyeva:	There	is	general	agreement	in	Rus-
sian	society	that	the	Western	model	of	development	cannot	automatically	be	
applied	in	Russia.	Those	advocating	the	Western	model	of	development	cur-
rently	account	for	33%	of	the	middle	class	(23%	on	average	in	other	segments	
of	society),	a	figure	which	has	dropped	by	around	10	percent	over	the	last	
decade	(from	43%	in	2003).	Members	of	the	middle	class	are	also	convinced	
that	the	norms	and	institutions	which	play	their	roles	effectively	in	devel-
oped	Western	societies	would	not	produce	the	same	outcomes	in	Russia.	The	
middle	class’s	attitude	towards	the	principle	of	the	rule	of	law	is	also	ambigu-
ous:	its	members	believe	that	one	should	abide	by	the	law	only	if	members	of	
the	state	bodies	also	abide	by	it	(the	results	in	the	other	segments	of	society	
were	practically	identical).
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This	 is	 largely	 due	 to	 the	 specificity	 and	 origins	 of	 the	Russian	
middle	class,	which	is	a	product of the period of oil-based pros-
perity under	 Putin.	 Administration	 officials,	 including	 mem-
bers	of	the	institutions	of	force,37	account	for	a	large	part	of	this	
group,	which	also	includes	a	considerable	number	of	people	who	
are	 formally	 private	 entrepreneurs	 or	 members	 of	 the	 liberal	
professions	but	have	economic	links	with	the	state,	that	is,	they	
benefit	from	public	procurement,	make	money	off	providing	ser-
vices	 to	 the	public	 sector,	etc.	This	generates	complex	 identities	
and	complicated	motivations	 in	 relations	with	 the	 state;	 on	one	
hand,	 representatives	of	middle	 class	 expect	gradual	 liberalisa-
tion	that	would	secure	their	rights,	but	on	the	other,	they	fear	any	
‘revolutionary’	change	that	could	cause	destabilisation.	The	opin-
ions	voiced	by	many	ordinary	members	of	the	middle	class	indi-
cate	that	those	people	do	not	expect	a	thorough	reform	of	the	state	
model,	but	simply	want	its	most	restrictive	aspects	to	be	remedied	
while	preserving	the	informal	(pathological)	rules	of	which	they	
themselves	 have	 also	 been	 beneficiaries.38	 For	 a	majority	 of	 the	
Russian	middle	class,	the	case	of	Ukraine	(and	especially	the	ca-
pability	of	 ‘the	street’	 to	change	governments)	 is	 tantamount	 to	
the	destruction	of	the	state,	while	their	most	desired	scenario	for	
Russia	seems	to	be	the	rule	of	Dmitry	Medvedev,	who	offered	miti-
gated	form	of	exercising	power	without	considerably	changing	its	
substance.	
A	‘politically motivated’ section of the middle class,	which	be-
lieves	that	a	deeper	reform	of	the	system	is	necessary,	also	exists	
in	Russia,	but	 it	cannot	create	the	critical	mass	needed	to	 influ-
ence	the	course	of	events.	 Its	development	has	been	arrested	by	
the	wave	of	restrictions	it	faced	in	the	aftermath	of	the	protests	
37	 According	to	estimates	by	Natalia	Tikhonova	(Russian	Academy	of	Sciences),	
around	half	the	middle-class	population	are	employed	in	the	public	sector	
and	their	incomes	are	not	regulated	by	the	market.	Op. cit.
38	 Members	of	the	middle	class	commonly	accept	corruption,	which	they	see	
as	a	way	of	resolving	situations	when	dealing	with	the	state	bodies,	or	when	
one	has	violated	the	law.
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in	2011–2012;	as	well	as	by	the	economic	decline,	which	has	hit	the	
sectors	where	its	members	make	their	living,	i.e.	the	independent	
media,	non-governmental	organisations	and	 the	advertising	 in-
dustry.39	Paradoxically,	open	borders	have	not	helped	this	group’s	
growth;	many	sworn	opponents	of	the	government	have	decided	
to	leave	the	country	because	of	the	lack	of	any	prospects	for	de-
mocratisation.	 Russia	 has	 experienced	 an	 unprecedented	 wave	
of	emigration	in	recent	years,40	which	mainly	involved	members	
of	the	middle	classes,	and	is	comparable	in	terms	of	scale	to	the	
emigration	wave	of	the	1990s.	It	has	contributed	to	the	growth	of	
Russian	diasporas	in	Central	Europe	(especially	in	Latvia,	with	its	
liberal	residency	rules,	as	well	as	Bulgaria	and	the	Czech	Repub-
lic)	and	in	Western	Europe	(London,	Berlin)41.	
The	phenomenon	observed	in	Russia, i.e.	the	periodic	political	mo-
bilisations	of	some	opposition	social	groups	(the	perestroika	wave	
in	the	mid-1980s,	the	first	half	of	the	1990s,	the	turn	of	2012)	could	
be	seen	as	cyclical social involvement.	Those	waves	of	activism	
have	triggered	(or	strengthened)	processes	at	the	national	 level,	
but	they	have	not	 led	to	the	formation	of	 lasting	and	influential	
civil	society	structures	that	could	defend	civil	rights	in	Russia	and	
strive	 to	establish	society	as	a	political	actor.	While	 the	general	
public	is	an	important	(or	even	crucial)	factor	in	the	government’s	
legitimacy,	at	the	same	time	it	is	being	effectively	manipulated	by	
the	government	using	economic	and	propaganda	methods.	How-
ever,	contrary	to	some	opinions,	 the	current	ruling	team	seems	
incapable	of	building a neo-totalitarian system	 involving	 the	
mobilisation	of	the	public	and	mass	repression.	The	obstacles	that	
prevent	 such	 a	 course	 include	both	 the	 lack	 of	 an	 effective	 and	
39	 The	SME	sector	has	shrunk	by	around	a	million	people.	For	more	informa-
tion,	see	Georgy	Stepanov, Российский средний класс расстается с амби-
циями,	Novyye Izvestia,	30	March	215.
40	 More	than	200,000	people	emigrated	from	Russia	permanently	in	2014,	and	
many	others	have	left	Russia	temporarily	or	moved	their	families	abroad.
41	 See	Jadwiga	Rogoża,	Emigracja	rozczarowanych	[Emigration	of	the	disillu-
sioned],	Nowa Europa Wschodnia [New Eastern Europe],	6/2014.
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efficient	 state	 apparatus,	 and	 the	 lack	of	 an	 inspiring	 and	 com-
monly	shared	ideology,	which	together	could	effectively	mobilise	
the	masses,	as	was	the	case	in	the	Stalinist	period.
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III. the outlooK for the future – change  
of the leaderShIP or the SyStem?
The	Putinist	model	of	state	is	facing	the	prospect	of	degradation 
and financial & organisational inefficiency.	The	resources	that	
the	Russian	state	will	command	in	the	coming	years	will	be	 in-
creasingly	insufficient	to	cover	the	inflated	budget	spending	lev-
els	of	the	recent	past,	and	or	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	unreformed	
and	capital-intensive	economy,	as	well	as	the	appetites	of	the	elites	
at	all	levels	and	the	extensive	network	of	lobbyists	who	have	been	
feeding	off	the	public	finance	in	Russia	and	expect	to	be	continu-
ally	supported	by	the	state.	Moreover,	the	quality	of	the	decisions	
being	taken	by	the	state	authorities	has	been	declining,	as	 they	
habitually	entail	 side-effects	which	 in	 themselves	often	require	
costly	remedial	measures.	As	mentioned	above,	the	annexation	of	
Crimea	has	led	to	a	spectacular	consolidation	of	Vladimir	Putin’s	
power,	but	it	also	triggered	a	confrontation	with	the	West	(which	
has	harmed	the	interests	of	many	groups	in	Russia)	and	the	sanc-
tions	which	have	hit	the	Russian	economy;	it	forced	Russia	to	start	
financing	 both	 the	 newly-acquired	 region	 and	 the	 subsequent	
military	operation	in	Donbas;	and	it	boosted	the	state’s	repressive	
nature,	again	striking	at	the	interests	of	large	sections	of	the	Rus-
sian	elite.	The	policy	of	confrontation	with	the	West	has	also	af-
fected	Russia’s	economic	model	based	on	exporting	the	resources	
–	of	which	the	European	Union	is,	and	will	for	some	time	remain,	
the	main	consumer	–	and	the	absorption	of	revenue	by	the	elite.42
Studies	of	the	Russian	state’s	condition	increasingly	refer	to	an	ag-
ony of the system,43	which	has	been	unable	to	generate	new	devel-
opment	projects,	and	whose	reaction	to	the	progressing	degrada-
tion	has	been	limited	to	escalating	repression	and	the	use	of	force.	
42	 As	Lilia	Shevtsova	has	said,	the	Kremlin	has	changed	Russia	into	a	fortress	
under	siege,	which	cannot	be	reconciled	with	another	paradigm,	that	of	Rus-
sia	the	petrol	station.	Своим возрождением Запад будет обязан Путину,	
colta.ru,	14	April	2015.
43	 See	Lilia	Shevtsova,	Has	the	Russian	System’s	Agony	Begun?,	op. cit.
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However,	the	symptoms	of	agony	do	not	automatically	mean	that	
the	collapse	of	the	Putinist	system	is	imminent.	The	system’s	agony	
may	turn	out	to	be	a	protracted	process,	because	there	are	many	
factors	in	Russia	which	increase	the system’s potential to endure,	
even	 while	 it	 continues	 to	 degrade.	 The	 economic	 and	 systemic	
factors	that	should	be	named	in	this	context	 include	the	 ‘manual	
control’	mechanisms	in	the	economy	which,	even	though	they	per-
petuate	the	archaic	and	inefficient	economic	model,	may	be	helpful	
in	postponing	crises	 in	 individual	branches	of	 the	economy,	sus-
taining	individual	strategically	important	enterprises,	or	regulat-
ing	the	prices	of	staple	foods,	which	is	vitally	important	for	the	less	
affluent	strata	of	society.	A	possible	improvement	in	the	market	for	
Russia’s	export	resources	in	the	coming	years	may	also	contribute	
to	extending	the	life	of	Russia’s	inefficient	economic	model.
A number	of	political	and	social	factors	will	also	contribute	to	sus-
taining	the inefficient system.	The	Russian	public	at	large,	which	
associates	any	change	of	government	with	destabilisation	and	cha-
os,	has	lent	the	ruling	camp	very	high	(albeit	passive)	support,	and	
is	susceptible	to	manipulation	by	the	government.	Meanwhile	that	
part	of	Russian	society	whose	attitudes	and	interests	run	counter	
to	the	government’s	line	is	too	weak	and	small	to	build	the	critical	
mass	needed	to	initiate	change.	The	attitude	of	the	broadly	under-
stood	elites	of	Russia,	i.e.	business,	the	state	administration	and	the	
intellectual	and	cultural	communities,	is	even	more	significant	for	
the	political	regime’s	viability.	Even	though	many	groups	in	the	elite	
(and	business	in	particular)	have	been	suffering	considerable	losses	
as	a	result	of	the	Russian	government’s	anti-Western	global-power	
politics	and	the	lack	of	reliable	guarantees	of	property	rights,	what	
they	fear	even	more	is	a	change	of	leadership	and	the	destabilisa-
tion	it	could	entail.	The	current	system,	while	far	from	perfect,	is	
still	regarded	as	a	lesser	evil	compared	to	the	prospect	of	change.	
The	 dominant	 view,	 also	 outside	 Russia,	 is	 that	 Vladimir	 Putin	
could	 only	 be	 replaced	 by	 ‘someone	 even	worse’,	 such	 as	 a	more	
radical	member	of	 the	 security	 services	or	a	nationalist.	This	at-
titude	testifies	to	the	efficacy	of	the	Kremlin’s	narrative,	which	has	
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been	building	an	image	of	Putin	as	the	sole	guarantor	of	political	
and	economic	stability,	the	sole	‘European’44	and	a	shield	to	protect	
the	oligarchs	and	the	assets	they	acquired	for	peanuts	in	the	1990s	
from	the	people’s	wrath.
At	 present,	 Putin’s	 inner	 circle,	 consisting	 of	 past	 and	 present	
members	of	the	secret	services,	has	the	greatest	and	most	direct	
influence	 on	 the	 Russian	 leader’s	 position	 and	 continued	 rule.	
Only	 this	group	seems	able	 to	exert	 influence	both	on	 the	deci-
sions	of	the	president	and	the	decisions	concerning	the	president.	
As	stated	above,	these	people	share	Putin’s	worldview,	while	the	
president	is	a	guarantee	that	they	retain	their	position	and	influ-
ence.	However,	the	greatest	challenge	to	the	system’s	stability	is	
posed	by	its	own	underlying	feature,	i.e.	the	fact	that	it	is	based	on	
informal	rules,	personal	links,	sympathies	and	relations	of	trust	
that	are	far	from	transparent	or	predictable.	In	such	conditions,	
external	observers	find	it	very	difficult	to	precisely	diagnose	and	
identify	 the	 relations	within	 the	 system,	 the	 shifting	 interests	
and	ambitions	of	individual	actors.	As	researchers	argue,	in	the	
event	 of	 a	 ‘palace	 coup’,	 the	 criteria	 guiding	 the	 elite	members	
conducting	the	coup	are	very	far	from	what	is	considered	as	pub-
lic	 policy	 criteria	 in	 democratic	 states.	 The	key	 factors	 concern	
neither	the	popularity	of	the	leader	to	be	toppled,	nor	levels	of	eco-
nomic	growth,	but	rather	 the	arbitrary	 interests	and	ambitions	
of	those	undertaking	the	coup.45	At	this	stage	it	could	be	said	that	
Putin’s	policy	has	also	been	 triggering	some	muted	reactions	 in	
his	closest	circle.	According	to	researchers,	the	voice	of	Yevgeny	
Primakov,	the	recently	deceased	former	prime	minister	and	head	
of	the	Foreign	Intelligence	Service,	highly	respected	in	the	secret	
44	 This	illustrates	a	certain	historical	continuity	in	the	thinking	of	the	Russian	
elite	and	intelligentsia,	whose	biggest	fear	concerns	a	‘revolt	of	the	masses’;	in	
this	context	one	often	hears	the	quote	from	Alexander	Pushkin:	“The	govern-
ment	is	the	sole	European	in	our	country”.
45	 See	Naunihal	Singh,	Seizing	power:	The	strategic	logic	of	military	coups,	in	
Yekaterina	Shulman,	Неокремлинология и ее пределы,	Vedomosti, 2	Febru-
ary	2015.
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service	community,	was	a	signal	of	 this	kind.	 In	his	 statements	
and	publications	 last	year,	Primakov	expressed	cautious	 scepti-
cism	about	the	conflict	with	the	West,	which	in	his	view	had	gone	
too	far,	and	the	losses	it	had	generated	for	Russia.46
Another	 challenge	 to	 the	 current	 personalised	 regime	 and	 Pu-
tin’s	position	comes	from	the	need	to	constantly	demonstrate the 
leader’s strength, skill and vitality.	In	such	a	system	the	presi-
dent’s	 image,	and	especially	the	way	he	 is	perceived	by	his	own	
circle,	is	as	important	as	his	formal	prerogatives.	This	is	visible	in	
the	Kremlin’s	propaganda,	which	has	been	emphasising	the	presi-
dent’s	personal	role	in	the	pivotal	moments	of	Russian	history	(the	
documentaries	mentioned	above	attribute	Russia’s	successes	over	
the	last	15	years	solely	to	Putin).	At	the	same	time,	Putin’s	indeci-
sion	in	some	crucial	situations	has	had	an	adverse	impact	on	his	
image.	Much	 criticism	was	 voiced	 after	 the	 president	 failed	 to	
adopt	a	decisive	stance	in	the	aftermath	of	Boris	Nemtsov’s	assas-
sination,	or	to	take	any	visible	measures	to	resolve	the	open	con-
flict	that	broke	out	at	that	time	between	the	secret	services	(the	
FSB	 and	 the	 Investigative	 Committee)	 and	 the	 Chechen	 leader	
Ramzan	Kadyrov.	The	president’s	 image	was	also	marred	by	his	
panicky	reaction	on	‘Black	Tuesday’	(16	December	2014,	when	the	
exchange	rate	of	the	rouble	against	the	dollar	and	the	euro	plum-
meted),	or	his	helplessness	during	the	annual	press	conferences	
in	December	2014	and	April	2015,	when	he	was	unable	to	present	
a	 convincing	 strategy	 for	 solving	 Russia’s	 deepening	 economic	
problems	 or	 offer	 a	 vision	 of	 Russia’s	 further	 development.	 Fi-
nally,	his	ten-day	disappearance	in	March	2015	also	created	a	bad	
impression,	as	it	triggered	a	wave	of	speculations	about	his	health	
and	 plastic	 surgery	 procedures	 that	 he	was	 allegedly	 undergo-
ing.	 Such	 critiques,	which	 are	 the	political	 norm	 in	democratic	
46	 Professor	Mark	Galeotti,	who	studies	the	Russian	power	elite,	has	coined	the	
term	‘seventh	column’	to	denote	the	influential	siloviks	in	Putin’s	inner	circle	
who	oppose	further	confrontation	with	the	Western	world	and	may	pose	
the	greatest	challenge	to	Putin’s	position.	See		https://inmoscowsshadows.
wordpress.com/2015/01/24/russias-intelligence-system-a-presentation
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countries,	resonate	widely	in	the	extremely	personalised	Russian	
system,	and	a	protracted,	unexplained	absence	of	the	leader	may	
upset	the	system	as	it	relies	on	the	‘manual	control’	mode.
The	evolution	of	the	Putinist	system	demonstrates	that	the	Rus-
sian	 leadership	has	 followed	 the	path	of	undemocratic	 regimes,	
which	 often	 start	 by	 carrying	 out	 reforms	 in	 the	 spirit	 of	 ‘en-
lightened	 absolutism’	 and	 end	up	preserving	 their	 power	using	
ever	more	radical	methods.	Such	systems	render	it	impossible	for	
those	in	power	to	step	down	voluntarily,	because	doing	so	would	
mean	losing	their	position,	assets,	and	sometimes	even	their	per-
sonal	security.	this makes a peaceful succession less likely to 
happen and	 imposes	 the	 logic	of	extending	the	 leader’s	rule	 in-
definitely,	which	 can	 only	 be	 limited	 by	 a	 “human	 factor”.	 The	
experience	of	the	last	15	years	of	Russia’s	history	shows	that	‘ex-
traordinary	means’,	i.e.	military successes and gains in foreign 
conflicts,	are	the	most	effective	way	to	consolidate	power.	Putin’s	
popularity	peaked	in	2000,	at	the	height	of	the	Second	Chechen	
War;	in	2008	during	the	armed	conflict	with	Georgia;	and	in	the	
years	2014–2015,	following	the	annexation	of	Crimea	and	during	
the	conflict	in	eastern	Ukraine.	Such	events	are	effective	in	mak-
ing	the	public	forget	about	internal	problems,	including	economic	
difficulties.47	 However,	 this	 mechanism	 may	 be	 double-edged,	
and	once	the	foreign	conflict	is	over,	the	society’s	attention	shifts	
back	to	internal	issues,	including	the	vital	question	of	standards	
of	living	(after	the	‘Georgian	euphoria’	public	sentiments	quickly	
started	to	deteriorate	as	a	result	of	the	economic	crisis	in	the	years	
2008–2009).	The	 subsidence	 of	 popular	 euphoria	 one	year	 after	
the	annexation	of	Crimea	also	proves	that	the	effects	of	the	use	of	
force	and	propaganda	inevitably	wear	off.	That,	in	turn,	makes	it	
more	likely,	or	even	inevitable,	that	the	use	of	such	methods	will	
be	escalated	and	the	fields	of	conflict	expanded.
47	 Mikhail	Dmitriyev, Внешнеполитический конфликт как основа рейтинга 
президента, Vedomosti, 1	March	2015.
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Even	though	the	Russian	leadership	has	instruments	to	prolong	
the	duration	of	the	current	system,	its	internal	unpredictability	
may	 result	 in	 the	 accumulation	of	negative	 factors	 and,	 in	 con-
sequence,	an	extensive crisis of the state.	While	 it	 is	probable	
that	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 such	 a	 crisis	 the	 country’s	 leadership	
may	be	replaced,	a	systemic change leading	to	the	formation	of	
a	decentralised	political	 system	based	on	 institutions	 is	a	much	
less	realistic	prospect.	The	authoritarian	model	of	power	rooted	
in	the	Russian	tradition	seems	set	to	outlast	the	current	Russian	
leadership.	At	this	stage,	there	are	no	major	forces	in	Russia	that	
could	 offer	 a	 programme	 for	 a	 deep	 reform	 of	 the	 state	model,	
even	among	the	opposition.	The	political	projects	that	exist,	such	
as	those	of	Alexei	Navalny	or	the	émigré	Mikhail	Khodorkovsky,	
are	general	and	do	not	have	many	supporters,	which	means	that	
at	this	stage	they	are	simply	utopian.	A	new	leadership	could	only	
be	‘ushered’	into	the	Kremlin	by	members	of	the	current	ruling	
elite,	who	are	likely	to	opt	for	systemic	and	personal	continuity.
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